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Articles

The African Regional Human Rights
System: The African Charter
Christof Heyns*
I.

Introduction

While the term "human rights" is of relative recent currency on the
continent, people have been struggling for freedom, dignity, equality,
and social justice for centuries in Africa. In Africa, as is the case
elsewhere, that which is now called human rights finds its foundations in
the struggle to assert these core values of human existence.'
Today, the term human rights is used widely in the African context.
The written constitutions of every country in Africa recognise the
concept; the inter-governmental organisation of African states, the
African Union, regards the realisation of human rights as one of its
objectives and principles; and the record of ratification of the human
* Professor of Human Rights Law and Director, Centre for Human Rights,
University of Pretoria. An earlier version of this Article was published in Spanish as
Christof Heyns, La Carta Africana de Derechos Humanos y de los Pueblos, in LA
PROTECCION INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LOS ALBORES DEL SIGLO

XXI 595-620 (F. Gomez Isa ed., 2003).
1. For an exposition of the approach that human rights and legitimate struggle are
two sides of the same coin, see Christof Heyns, A "Struggle Approach" to Human
Rights, in PLURALISM AND LAW 171 (Arend Soeteman ed., 2001).
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rights treaties of the United Nations by African countries is on a par with
practices around the world.2 There is wide acceptance that the future of
Africa will have to be based on that which is internationally known as
human rights.
Not surprisingly, given the history of Africa, the struggle roots of
the concept of human rights are clearly visible in the human rights
A significant number of African
documents of the continent.
constitutions explicitly recognise a direct right, located in the people, to
protect constitutional and human rights norms, if need be, through
political struggle.3 The foundational document of the African Union
uniquely provides for a right of humanitarian intervention in member
states by the Union, in cases of grave human rights violations. The
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also reflects in many
ways a reaction to the continental experience of slavery and colonialism,
for example by recognising a "peoples' right to self-determination.
Human Rights in this context, it could be said, is seen as "a demand by
citizens backed by a threat"--the threat of struggle.
However, the struggle for human rights on the African continent is
far from over or complete. The continent is plagued by widespread
violations of human rights, often on a massive scale. The process to
establish effective institutional structures that will help to consolidate
and to protect the hard earned gains of the freedom struggles of the past
has become a struggle in its own right. No doubt, the most important
task in this regard is to establish legal and political systems on the
national level that protect human rights. But regional attempts to change
the human rights practices of the continent, and to create safety nets for
those cases not effectively dealt with on the national level, are assuming
increased importance.
This Article describes the institutional human rights structures
created on a continental level in Africa. The specific focus is on the
general human rights treaty of Africa, the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, as the legal foundation of a system that could potentially
play the same role as is the case with the regional human rights systems
in Europe and the Americas. The underlying question is how this could
2. For a collection of the primary material dealing with human rights law in Africa
on the United Nations, regional, sub-regional, and domestic levels of all the countries of
Africa, see HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (Christof Heyns ed.). So far, volumes for
1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 have been published; a consolidated volume updated to 2002
is forthcoming. References will hereinafter be made to HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA
with the relevant year in brackets.
3. The explicit recognition of a right of resistance to protect constitutional and
human rights norms is present in the Constitutions of Benin (1990) (art. 66); Cape Verde
(1992) (art. 18); Ghana (1992) (art. 3(4) & (5)); Togo (1992) (art. 150); Chad (1996)
(Preamble); and Burkina Faso (1997) (art. 167).
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be achieved in the most effective way.
II.

Sources

The African regional system has been developed under the auspices
of the Organization of African Unity ("OAU"), 4 which was transformed
in 2002 into the African Union ("AU"). 5 While the Charter of the OAU
of 1963 made only passing reference to the concept of human rights,6 the
Constitutive Act of the AU of 2001 has now placed human rights
squarely on the agenda of the new regional body.7
The central document of the African regional system, the African
4. See GINO J. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS
ROLE 109 (1999).
5. Constitutive Act of the African Union CAB/LEG/23.15 (May 26, 2001)
[hereinafter Constitutive Act].
6. 47 U.N.T.S. 39 (1963), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1998),
supra note 2, at 117. The Preamble stated adherence to the principles of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The Charter of the OAU was nevertheless a human rights
document in the sense that it was aimed at the abolition of colonialism and apartheid.
7. The Constitutive Act, in its Preamble, refers to the African struggles for
independence and human dignity "by our peoples" and the determination of the Heads of
State and Government "to promote and protect human and peoples' rights." According to
article 3:
the objectives of the Union shall be to . . . (e) encourage international
cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;" and to "... . (h) promote and protect
human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.
Constitutive Act, supra note 5, at art. 3. It is stated in article 4:
The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: . . . (g)
non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; (h) the
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity; ... (1) promotion of gender equality; (m) respect for
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; (n)
promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development; (o)
respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity
and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; (p)
condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.
Id. at art. 4. According to article 23(2):
any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the
Union may be subjected to ... sanctions, such as the denial of transport and
communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a
political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly.
Id. at art. 23(2). Article 30 provides: "Governments which shall come to power through
unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union."
Id. at art. 30. For a discussion, see Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for better
Protectionof Human Rights in Africa?, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 299 (2001). A new set of
proposed amendments by the Executive Council of the AU, adopted unanimously in
February 2003 by the Assembly, envisages a stronger role for the AU in terms of the
restoration of peace and order in member states. See AFRICAN UNION, EXECUTIVE
ASSEMBLY 4(I), Ppt(l) (2003). This could potentially be used to undermine human rights.
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Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("African Charter"),8 was opened
for signature in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. It has been ratified
by all fifty-three member states of the OAU/AU. 9 The sole supervisory
body of the African Charter currently in existence is the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights ("African Commission").
The African Commission was constituted and met for the first time in
1987. The Commission has adopted its own Rules of Procedure
(amended in 1995)10 and Guidelines for State Reporting (amended in
1998).I"

The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights ("African Human Rights Court Protocol") 12 was adopted in 1998.
The Protocol entered into force January 25, 2004 after receiving the
necessary fifteen ratifications.
The Annual Activity Reports of the Commission, which reflect the
decisions, resolutions, and other acts of the Commission, are submitted
each year for permission to publish to the meeting of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government ("Assembly") of the OAU/AU, which
takes place in June or July of the following year.' 3 The Decisions of the
Commission have now been published in a separate volume. 14 A small

but growing number of secondary publications on the work of the
Commission have appeared. 15 Information on the work of the
8. African Charter on Human and People's Rights OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5
(Org. of African Unity) (1996), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1996),
supra note 2, at 7 [hereinafter African Charter].
See AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES' RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE INTERIM
9.
CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF AU TREATIES EX/CL/36(IlI) (June

17, 2003). This Report is also used elsewhere in this Article in respect to ratification
figures. For the three reservations to the African Charter, see HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
AFRICA (1997), supra note 2, at 10.
10.

AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN

& PEOPLES'

RIGHTS,

RULES OF PROCEDURE

ACHPR/RP/XIX, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1997), supra note 2, at

1l.
11. The first and most elaborate set of guidelines was adopted by the Commission in
1988. A second and apparently additional set of guidelines, which is much more concise,
was adopted by the Commission in 1998. AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES'
RIGHTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE REPORTING 05/27 (XXIII) (1998), reprintedin HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1998), supra note 2, at 125.
12. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND

PEOPLES' RIGHTS (1) REV. 2 (1998), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1999),
supra note 2, at 279 [hereinafter AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTOCOL].
13.

See DOCUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

(Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2001).
14. See INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & DEV. IN AFRICA, COMPILATION OF DECISIONS ON
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS (2000-

2001). The latest edition covers up to the 14th Annual Activity Report.
15. Among the most prominent are EVELYN ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION
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Commission is available on a number of websites. 16 A Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa was adopted at the African Union Summit in Maputo in July
2003.17
In addition to the African Charter, the African regional human
rights system is comprised of the OAU Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa ("African Refugee
Convention") of 1969,' 8 which entered into force in 1974 (44
ratifications); and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child ("African Children's Charter") of 1990,19 which came into force in
1999 (32 ratifications). A special monitoring body for the African
Children's Charter has been created. The African Committee on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child had its first meeting in 2002 in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.2 °
The relatively unknown Cultural Charter for Africa of 1976 came
into force in 1990 (33 state parties). 2 1 There are also two African treaties
dealing with the environment, although not from a human rights
perspective. 22
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES (1996); On UMOzURIKE,
THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS (1997); THE AFRICAN CHARTER

ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986-2000 (Malcolm Evans
& Rachel Murray eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN
PRACTICE]. For a detailed overview, see the regularly updated contribution by Frans
Viljoen in the annual volumes of the HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA Series. See also
FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: A

COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2003). Developments in the system are
covered on a regular basis in the African Human Rights Law Journal,since 2001.

16. See African Comm 'n on Human & Peoples' Rights, at
http://www.achpr.org; African Union, at http://www.African-union.org; Univ. of
Minnesota
Human
Rights
Library,
at
http://www.un.edu/humanrts/Africa/index.htm.
17.
For the latest version, see AFRICAN UNION, PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN CAB/LEG/66.6/Rev. 1.

(2003), available at http://www.African-union.org. See also Martin Nsibirwa, A Brief
Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights on
the Rights of Women, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40 (2001).
18. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa OAU
Doc CAB/LEG/24.3, reprintedin HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INAFRICA (1997), supra note 2, at
34.
19.

African

Charter on the Rights

and Welfare of the

Child, OAU

Doc

CAB/LEG/153/Rev 2, reprintedin HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INAFRICA (1997), supra note 2,
at 38.
20. See A. Lloyd, The First Meeting of the African Committee of Experts on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, 2 AFR. HuM. RTS. L.J. 320 (2002).
21. Cultural Charter for Africa of 1976 (1990), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 55.
22. The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(1968-69), reprintedin HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INAFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 47, and
the [Bamako] Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
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The development programme of the AU, the New Partnership for
Africa's Development ("NEPAD"), has a strong human rights
component2 3 and provides for the development of an African Peer
Review Mechanism, which will also deal with the human rights practices
of member states.24
A perhaps more indirect response to the occurrence of massive
human rights violations in Africa has been the attempt to develop
mechanisms to deal with conflict in Africa.2 5
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa
(1991/98), reprintedin HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 108. See
also M. van der Linde, A Review of the African Convention on Nature and Natural
Resources, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 33 (2002).
23. See NEW P'SHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEV., DECLARATION ON DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I, available at
www.nepad.org. Section 10 provides as follows:
In the light of Africa's recent history, respect for human rights has to be
accorded an importance and urgency all of its own. One of the tests by which
the quality of a democracy is judged is the protection it provides for each
individual citizen and for the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Ethnic
minorities, women and children have borne the brunt of the conflicts raging on
the continent today. We undertake to do more to advance the cause of human
rights in Africa generally and, specifically, to end the moral shame exemplified
by the plight of women, children, the disabled and ethnic minorities in conflict
situations in Africa.
Id. Under the heading "Democracy and Good Political Governance," section 13
provides:
In support of democracy and the democratic process, We will: ensure that our
respective national constitutions reflect the democratic ethos and provide for
demonstrably accountable governance; promote political representation, thus
providing for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair
political environment; enforce strict adherence to the position of the African
Union (AU) on unconstitutional changes of government and other decisions of
our continental organization aimed at promoting democracy, good governance,
peace and security; strengthen and, where necessary, establish an appropriate
electoral administration and oversight bodies, in our respective countries and
provide the necessary resources and capacity to conduct elections which are
free, fair and credible; reassess and where necessary strengthen the AU and
sub-regional election monitoring mechanisms and procedures; and heighten
public awareness of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
especially in our educational institutions.
Id.; see also NEW P'SHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEV., DECLARATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (I). For a discussion, see Evarist

Baimu, Human Rights in NEPAD and Its Implicationsfor the African Human Rights
System, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 301 (2002).
24.

The NEW P'SHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEV.,

AFRICAN

PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 2, available at www.nepad.org, provides for the
appointment of a Panel of Eminent Persons to conduct peer review of member states also
in respect of democracy and good political governance (arts. 4 & 14).
25. See African Union, Declaration on the Establishment of a Mechanism for
Conflict Prevent, Management and Resolution, AHG/DECL. 3 (XXIX), available at
www.African-union.org. The Central Organ of this Mechanism was included as an organ
of the AU at the 37th OAU Assembly in 2001. According to article 22 of the Protocol
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The African Human Rights Court, once established, is clearly
intended to be an independent judicial body, but as a result the political
impact of its decisions is uncertain. The NEPAD African Peer Review
Mechanism, on the other hand, is largely political and as such could
potentially, in the short term, have a stronger impact, but it remains an
open question to what extent such a political body could be expected to
protect the human rights of the weak in an independent fashion. The
African Commission, as a quasi-judicial body, occupies a position
somewhere in between, and could potentially share either the positive or
the negative aspects of the other two bodies depending on how it is
managed.
III.
A.

The African Charter
Background

As was alluded to above, the 1963 OAU Charter did not recognise
the realisation of human rights as such as one of the objectives of that
body. It would only be in 1979 that a meeting of experts was gathered
by the OAU in Dakar, Senegal to prepare a preliminary draft of a human
rights charter for Africa.2 6 This culminated in the Draft African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, finalised in Banjul, The Gambia in 1981
(resulting in the name "Banjul Charter," a name sometimes used for the
African Charter). The African Charter was formally adopted by the
OAU in Kenya later that year. 27
A number of reasons have been advanced for why the OAU
changed its approach and gave the concept of human rights the
prominence offered by the Charter during the late 1970s and the early
1980s.
These include the increased emphasis on human rights
internationally at the time (as in the foreign policy of President Carter of
the United States of America), the use to which the concept of human
rights was put in international bodies such as the United Nations and the
OAU to condemn the apartheid practices in South Africa, and abhorrence
at the human rights violations in some newly independent African states,
including Uganda, Central African Republic, and Equatorial Guinea.
The African Charter recognises a wide range of internationally

Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of Africa, available at
www.African-union.org, this Council will replace the earlier mechanism.
26. The meeting was convened in terms of a decision of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. See HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 127.

27.

For the documents leading up to the adoption of the African Charter, see HUMAN

RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 65-105.
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accepted human rights norms, but also has some unique features,
elaborated upon below. 28 Several reasons have been advanced for why
only a Commission, and not a Court, was provided for in the African
Charter in 1981 as the body responsible for monitoring compliance of
state parties with the Charter. On the one hand there is the more
idealistic explanation that the traditional way of solving disputes in
Africa is through mediation and conciliation, not through the adversarial,
"win or lose" mechanism of a court. On the other hand there is the view
that the member states of the OAU were protective of their newly found
sovereignty, and did not wish to limit it by means of a supra-national
court.
The notion of a human rights court for Africa would be taken up by
the OAU thirteen years after the adoption of the African Charter when, in
1994, the Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the SecretaryGeneral of the OAU to convene a Meeting of Experts to consider the
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.29
This eventually led to the adoption of the African Human Rights Court
Protocol in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1998.30
Ostensibly, the concept of human rights was accepted widely
enough in Africa in the early 1990s for the decision to be made to give
more "teeth" to the African human rights system in the form of a Court.
This came in the wake of the different waves of democratisation on the
national level, epitomised by the watershed elections in Benin in 1991
and the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994. Worldwide, of
course, the idea of human rights also gained prominence after the end of
the Cold War.
B. Norms Recognised
We now turn to a consideration of the norms recognised in the
African Charter and the nature of its enforcement mechanisms.
The civil and political rights recognised in the African Charter are
in many ways similar to those recognised in other international
instruments, and these rights have in practical terms received most of the

28. In his welcoming address in 1979 to the Meeting of African Experts preparing
the Draft African Charter in Dakar, Senegal, Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal,
referred to the example set by international human rights instruments, and said: "As
Africans, we shall neither copy, nor strive for originality, for the sake of originality ...
[Y]ou must keep constantly in mind our values of civilisation and the real needs of
Africa." HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 78-79.
29. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, RESOLUTION 230 (XXX) (1994), reprintedin HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 139.

30. The documents leading up to the adoption of the African Human Rights Court
Protocol are reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INAFRICA (1999), supranote 2, at 233-96.
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attention of the African Commission.3 1
The Charter recognises the following rights as individual rights:
freedom from discrimination; 32 equality; 33 bodily integrity and the right35
to life; 34 dignity and prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment;
information
liberty and security; 36 fair trial; 3 7 freedom of conscience;438
39 freedom of association; 0 assembly; 41
expression;
of
and freedom
44
43
42
freedom of movement; political participation; and property.
A number of possible shortcomings in respect to civil and political
rights in the African Charter could be noted. There is, for example, no
explicit reference in the Charter to a right to privacy; the right against
forced labour is not mentioned by name; and the right to a fair trial 45 and
the right of political participation 46 are given scant protection in
comparison with international standards.
In addition, the way in which the Charter deals with gender issues
has been a bone of contention. Article 18(3) provides as follows: "The
state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women
and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as
stipulated in international declarations and conventions. '' 7
This lumping together of women and children in an article that deals
primarily with the family, re-enforces outdated stereotypes about the
proper place and role of women in society and has been partially
31.

For a full discussion, see Christof Heyns, Civil and Political Rights in the

African Charter,in THE AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, supra note 15, at

137.
32. African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 2.
33. Id. at art. 3.
34. Id. at art. 4.
35. Id. at art. 5.
36. Id. at art. 6.
37. ld.at art. 7.
38. Id. at art. 8.
39. Id. at art. 9.
40. Id.at art. 10.
41. Id. at art. 11.
42. Id.at art. 12.
43. Id. at art. 13.
44. Id. at art. 14.
45. There is, for example, no explicit reference to the right to a public hearing, the
ight to interpretation, the right against self-incrimination, and the right against double
jeopardy. However, the Commission has interpreted the Charter protection to encompass
See, e.g., ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N,
some of these rights.
COMMUNICATION 224/98, Media Rights Agenda & Others v. Nigeria, 14TH ANNUAL
ACTIVITY REPORT (2000).

46. While article 13(1) of the Charter recognises the right "of every citizen to
participate freely in the government of his country," it does not stipulate that this should
be done through regular, free, and fair elections based on universal suffrage. See African
Charter, supra note 8, at art. 13(1).
47. Id. at art. 18(3).
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responsible for the drive to adopt the Protocol to the African Charter on
the Rights of Women in Africa.
The way in which the African Charter deals with restrictions on all
rights, including civil and political rights, presents a significant obstacle.
The African Charter does not contain a general limitation clause
(although, as is noted below, article 27(2) is starting to play this role).
This means that there are no general guidelines on how Charter rights
should be limited-no clear "limits on the limitations," so to speak. A
well-defined system of limitations is important. A society in which
rights cannot be limited will be ungovernable, but it is essential that
appropriate human rights norms be set for the limitations.
A number of the articles of the Charter setting out specific civil and
political rights do contain limiting provisions applicable to those
particular rights. Some of these internal limitations clearly spell out the
procedural and substantive norms with which limitations should
comply, 48 while others only describe the substantive requirements that
limitations must meet.49
A last category of these limitation clauses merely poses the
apparently procedural requirement that limitations should be done
"within the law." An example of this category of internal limitations is
article 9(2), which provides as follows: "Every individual shall have the
right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law."5 ° This
kind of limitation is generally known as "claw-back clauses." Claw-back
clauses seem to recognise the right in question only to the extent that
such a right is not infringed upon by national law.
If that is the correct interpretation, the claw-back clauses would
obviously undermine the whole idea of international supervision of
domestic law and practices and render the Charter meaningless in respect
to the rights involved. Domestic law will, in those cases, have to be
measured according to domestic standards-a senseless exercise. What
is given with the one hand is seemingly taken away with the other.
It should be noted, however, that the Charter has a very expansive
approach in respect to interpretation. In terms of articles 60 and 61, the
Commission has to draw inspiration from international human rights law
in interpreting the provisions of the Charter. The Commission has used
these provisions very liberally in a number of instances to bring the
48. For example, article 11 recognises the right of freedom of assembly, subject to
the following proviso: "The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary
restrictions provided for by law, in particular those enacted in the interests of national
security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others." Id. at art. 11.
49. Article 8 provides that the freedom of conscience and religion may only be
limited in the interest of "law and order." Id. at art. 8.
50. Id. at art. 9(2).
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Charter in line with international practices, and the claw-back clauses are
no exception.
In the context of the claw-back clauses, the African Commission
has held that provisions in articles that allow rights to be limited "in
accordance with law," should be understood to require such limitations
provisions, which comply with
to be done in terms of domestic legal
5
international human rights standards. 1
Through this innovative interpretation, the Commission has gone a
long way towards curing one of the most troublesome inherent
deficiencies in the Charter. However, it remains unfortunate that the
Charter, to those who have not had the benefit of exposure to the
approach of the Commission, will continue to appear to condone
infringements of human rights norms as long as it is done through
domestic law.
An overview of some Commission decisions concerning specific
civil and political rights provides a sample of the Commission's
approach.
In a number of cases the Commission has held that there is a
positive duty on state parties to protect those in their jurisdictions against
violations by other private parties. In a case concerning Mauritania, the
Commission found that, although slavery had officially been abolished in
that country, this was not effectively enforced by the government.5 2 In a
case involving Chad, the Commission likewise held that the state's
failure to protect people under its jurisdiction during a civil war against
attacks by unidentified militants, not proven to be government agents,
constituted a violation of the right to life. 3
trials on non-Muslims has been held to
The imposition of Shari'a
54
violate freedom of religion.
51.

The Commission has held, e.g., in Communications 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, and

152/96, Media Rights Agenda & Others v. Nigeria, paragraph 66: "To allow national law

to have precedence over the international law of the Charter would defeat the purpose of

the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. International human rights standards
must always prevail over contradicting national law." ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN
COMM'N, Media Rights Agenda & Others v. Nigeria, 12TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT
(1998-99).
52.

ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATIONS 54/91,

61/91,

98/93, 164-196/97, & 210/98, Malawi African Ass'n & Others v. Mauritania, 13TH
ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (1999).
ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY,
53.

AFRICAN

COMM'N,

COMMUNICATION

74/92,

Commission Nationale des Droit de l'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad, 9TH ANNUAL
ACTIVITY REPORT (1995-96) [hereinafter ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, Commission
Nationale]; see also ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMIMUNICATION

155/96, The Social & Economic Rights Action Center & Another v. Nigeria, 15TH
ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (2001-02).
54. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATIONS 48/90, 50/91,
52/91, & 89/93155/96, Amnesty Int'l v. Sudan, 13TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (1999).
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In Media Rights Agenda & Others v. Nigeria,55 the Commission
ruled against the Abacha government's clampdown on freedom of
expression, and determined that politicians should be provided less
protection from free expression than other people. As with many of the
seemingly more bold decisions of the Commission, this decision was
unfortunately handed down only after the Abacha regime had fallen.
Nevertheless, a positive precedent was set.
The suspension of national elections was held to violate the right to
political5 6participation in Constitutional Rights Project & Another v.
Nigeria.
The Commission has held that decrees ousting the jurisdiction of
courts to examine the validity of such decrees violate the fair trial
provision of the Charter, 57 and also that the creation of special tribunals,
dominated by members of the executive, violates the same right.58
A unique feature of the Charter is the inclusion of socio-economic
rights in a regional human rights treaty, alongside the civil and political
rights mentioned above. 59
The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Charter is significant,
in that it emphasises the indivisibility of human rights and the
importance of developmental issues, which are obviously important
matters in the African context. At the same time, the fact that only a
modest number of socio-economic rights are explicitly included in the
Charter should be noted. The Charter only recognises "a right to work
under equitable and satisfactory conditions,, 60 a right to health, 61 and a
right to education. 62 Some prominent socio-economic rights are not
mentioned by name, such as the right to food and water (or nutrition),
social security, and housing.
It is also somewhat surprising that the socio-economic rights that
are recognised are not explicitly made subject to the usual internal
qualifiers that apply to such rights in most international instrumentssuch as the provision that the state is only required to ensure progressive
55.
56.
57.

ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 51, at para. 74.
Id.at 102/93.
ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATION

129/94, Civil

Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria Amnesty Int'l v. Sudan, 9TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT

(1995-96).
58.

ORG.

OF

AFRICAN

UNITY,

AFRICAN

COMM'N,

COMMUNICATION

60/91,

Constitutional Rights Project (Akamu) v. Nigeria, 8TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (1994-

95).
59.

For a discussion, see Chidi Odinkalu, Implementing Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, in THE
AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYSTEM INPRACTICE, supra note 15, at 178.

60.
61.
62.

African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 15.
Id. at art. 16.
Id.at art. 17.
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realisation, subject to available resources, etc. This is made more
problematic by the absence of a general limitation clause in the Charter,
as discussed above. A selected few socio-economic rights, stated in near
absolute terms, are recognised, while other obvious candidates for
inclusion are not present.
The socio-economic rights in the Charter have received scant
attention from the Commission, but in a prominent case the Commission
dealt with the issue and in effect held that the internationally recognised
socio-economic rights that are not explicitly recognised in the Charter
should be regarded as implicitly included.
The so-called SERAC v. Nigeria decision dealt with the destruction
of part of Ogoniland by a petroleum company acting in co-operation with
In an extraordinary decision, the
the government of Nigeria.63
Commission held that the presence of an implicit right to "housing or
shelter" in the Charter has to be deduced from the explicit provisions on
health, property and family life in the Charter.64 Similarly, a right to
food has to be read into the right to dignity and other rights.65 It was
accepted, without argument, that the Ogoni's constituted a "people."
As with the claw-back clauses, the approach of the Commission in
filling in the gaps in the Charter in the SERAC case could be seen as a
creative and bold move on the part of the Commission, but it leaves the
Charter exposed as an outdated document in need of revision to ensure
that it actually says, loud and clear, what it has been interpreted by the
Commission to say. The current discrepancy between the wording of the
Charter and the interpretation of the Commission undermines the
principle of the rule of law above the rule by people.
There are other, more exotic features of the Charter that have
attracted their fair share of academic and political commentary but have
figured less in the pronouncements of the Commission.
The Charter, for example, recognises "peoples' rights. 66 All
"peoples," according to the Charter, have a right to be equal; 67 to
existence and self-determination; 68 and to freely dispose of their wealth
and natural resources. 69 Clearly a major part of the motivation for the
recognition of "peoples' rights" lies in the fact that entire "peoples" have
63.

ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATION 155/96, The

Social & Economic Rights Action Center & Another v. Nigeria, 15TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY
REPORT (2001-02).

64. Id. at para. 60.
65. Id. at para. 65.
66. See Rachel Murray & Steven Wheatley, Groups and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, 25 HuM. RTS. Q. 213 (2003).
67. African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 19.
68. Id. at art. 20.
69. Id. at art. 21.
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been colonised and otherwise exploited in the history of Africa and have
had to engage in protracted struggles to realise their human rights.
This concept has been referred to in some of the cases before the
Commission, including the following two cases.
In a case concerning Katangese secessionists in the former Zaire, a
complaint was brought on the basis that the Katangese people had a
right, as a people, to self-determination in the form of independence.7 °
The Commission ruled against them on the basis that there was no
evidence that a Charter provision had been violated because widespread
human rights violations or a lack of political participation by the
Katangese people had not been proven. 7 1 This seems to suggest that if
these conditions were met, secession by such a "people" could be a
permissible option.
In a case concerning the 1994 coup d'etat against the democratically
elected government of The Gambia, the Commission held that this
violated the right to self-determination of the people of The Gambia as a
whole.72
The Charter recognises duties in addition to rights.73 For example,
individuals have duties towards their families and society,74 and state
75
parties have the duty to promote the Charter.
Perhaps the most significant provision under the heading "Duties" is
article 27(2), which reads as follows: "The rights and freedoms of each
individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others,
collective security, morality and common interest., 76 This provision has
now in effect been given the status of a general limitation clause by the
African Commission.
According to the Commission: "The only
legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the
African Charter are found in article 27(2) ....
The Commission's use of article 27(2) as a general limitation clause
seems to confirm the view that the concept of "duties" should not be
understood as a sinister way of saying rights should first be earned, or
that meeting certain duties is a precondition for enjoying human rights.
70. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATION 75/92, Congrds
du Peuple Katangais v. Zaire, 8TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (1994-95).
71. Id.
72. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATIONS 147/95 &
149/95, Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, 13TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (1999).

73.

See Makau Mutua, The Banjul Charterand the African CulturalFingerprint,35

VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995).

74.
75.
76.

African Charter, supranote 8, at arts. 27-29.
Id. at art. 25; see also id. at art. 26.
Id. at art. 27(2).
77. See ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 51, at para. 68; ORG. OF AFRICAN
UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATIONS 140/94, 141/94, & 145/95, Constitutional
Rights Project & Others v. Nigeria, para. 41, 13TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (1999).
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Rather, it implies that the exercise of human rights, which are "natural"
or valid in themselves,78 may be limited by the duties of individuals.
Rights precede duties, and the recognition of duties is merely another
way of signifying the kind of limitations that may be placed on rights.
The African Charter does not contain a provision either allowing or
disallowing derogation from its provisions during a state of emergency.
This has led the Commission to the conclusion that derogation is not
possible. 79 This conclusion is unfortunate because it means that in real
emergencies the Charter will be ignored and will not exercise a
restraining influence.
C. Enforcement Mechanism: The African Commission
As was mentioned earlier, the African Charter, as adopted in 1981,
provided only for the creation of a Commission and not a Court on
Human Rights, in contrast with the other two regional systems which, at
the time, had both.
The African Commission consists of eleven commissioners, who
serve in their individual capacities. 80 The Commission meets twice a
year in regular sessions for a period of up to two weeks. The
Commissioners are nominated by state parties to the Charter and elected
by the Assembly. 8 1 The Secretariat of the Commission is based in
Banjul, The Gambia. The Commission alternates its meetings between
Banjul and other African capitals. The Commission has a protective as
well as a promotional mandate. 82
The main mechanisms employed by the Commission to fulfill its
task of supervising compliance with Charter norms by state parties are
the following.
1. The Complaints Procedure
Both states and individuals may bring complaints to the African
Commission alleging violations of the African Charter by state parties.
The procedure by which one state brings a complaint about an
alleged human rights violation by another state has only been used once

78. See African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 5 ("[I]nherent in a human being," in
respect of dignity).
79. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, Commission Nationale, supra note 53, at para. 21.
80. African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 31.
81. Id. at art. 33.
82. Id. at art. 45(1)-(2). On the promotional mandate, see Victor Dankwa, The
Promotional Role of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, in THE
AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 335.
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in a case.8 3 Currently that case is pending before the Commission.84
The so-called individual communication or complaints procedure is
not clearly provided for in the African Charter. One reading of the
Charter is that communications could be considered only where "serious
or massive violations" are at stake, which then triggers the rather futile
article 58 procedure described below.
However, the African
Commission has accepted from the start that it has the power to deal with
complaints about any human rights violations under the Charter,
provided the admissibility criteria are met.85
The Charter is silent on the question of who can bring such
complaints, but the Commission's practice is that complaints from
individuals as well as non-governmental organizations are accepted. The
individual complaints procedure is used much more frequently than the
inter-state mechanism, although not as frequently as one might have
expected on a continent with the kind of human rights problems like
Africa's. 86 The potential of this mechanism has not nearly been
exhausted.
As with other complaints systems, the African Charter imposes
certain admissibility criteria before the Commission may entertain
complaints.8 7 These criteria include the important requirement of
exhausting local remedies. The Commission may be approached only
once the matter has been pursued in the highest court in the country in
question without success or the prospect of success. 88 Uniquely, there is
also a requirement that the communications are "not written in
disparaging or insulting language directed against the state concerned
and its institutions or to the Organization of African Unity. 8 9
When a complaint is lodged, the state in question is asked to
83.

African Charter, supra note 8, at arts. 47-54.
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COMMUNICATION

227/99,

Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, & Uganda, 15TH
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85. Following directly after the provisions on inter-state communications, article 55
provides for "other communications." African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 55. The
Commission has proceeded from the assumption that this refers to individual
communications.
86. This could perhaps largely be attributed to a lack of awareness about the system,
but even where there is awareness, there is often not much faith that the system can make
a difference.
87. Id. at art. 56. For a discussion, see F. Viljoen, Admissibility under the African
Charter,in THE AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYSTEM INPRACTICE, supra note 15, at 6 1.
88. This is provided that these channels offer a reasonable prospect of success. For a
full discussion, see Frans Viljoen, Admissibility under the African Charter, in THE
AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 61.

89. African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 56(3). Fortunately this provision has not
yet been used in the Commission as an argument to limit freedom of expression in
respect to political figures.
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respond to the allegations against it. If the state does not respond, the
Commission proceeds on the basis of the facts as provided by the
complainant. 90 If the decision of the Commission is that there has indeed
been a violation or violations of the Charter, the Commission sometimes
also makes recommendations that continuing violations should stop (e.g.,
prisoners be released) or specific laws be changed; but mostly the
recommendations are rather vague, and the state party is merely urged to
"adopt measures in conformity with the decision."
Two of the more controversial articles of the Charter apply to the
way in which the Commission is supposed to deal with individual
communications. Article 58 provides that "special cases which reveal
the existence of serious or massive violations of human and peoples'
rights" must be referred by the Commission to the Assembly, which
"may then request the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of
these cases." 9 1 When the Commission has followed this route, the
Assembly has failed to respond, but the Commission has nevertheless
made findings that such massive violations have occurred. Today, the
Commission does not seem to refer cases anymore to the Assembly in
terms of article 58.
Article 59 provides:
(1) All measures taken within the provisions of the present Charter
shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government shall otherwise decide.
(2) However, the report shall be published by the Chairman of the
Commission upon92 the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government.
In practice, the Assembly serves as a rubber stamp for the
publication of the report by the Commission containing its decisions, but
the principle that the very people in charge of the institutions whose
human rights practices are at stake-the heads of state-should take the
final decision on publicity undermines the legality of the system.
2. Consideration of State Reports
Each state party is required to submit a report every two years on its

90.

See, e.g., ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, Commission Nationale, supra note 53, at

para. 25; see also Rachel Murray, Evidence andFact-finding by the African Commission,
in THE AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYsTEM INPRACTICE, supra note 15, at 100.
91. African Charter, supra note 8, at art. 58.
92. Id. at art. 59.
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efforts to comply with the African Charter. 93 Although it is not provided
for in the African Charter that the reports should be submitted
specifically to the African Commission, the Commission recommended
to the Assembly that the Commission be given the mandate to consider
the reports. The Assembly has endorsed this recommendation. 94 Nongovernmental organizations ("NGO") are allowed to submit shadow or
alternative reports, but the impact of this avenue is diminished by the
NGO's lack of timely access to the state reports to which they are
supposed to respond. The reports are considered by the Commission in
public sessions. Reporting by state parties under the African Charter has
to be done in accordance with the guidelines mentioned above.
Reporting under the Charter, as in other systems, is aimed at
facilitating both introspection and inspection. "Introspection" refers to
the process when the state, in writing its report, measures itself against
the norms of the Charter. "Inspection" refers to the process when the
Commission measures the performance of the state in question against
the Charter. The objective is to facilitate a "constructive dialogue"
between the Commission and the states.
Reporting has been very tardy, with approximately half of the state
parties not submitting any reports. In 2001, the Commission started to
issue concluding observations in respect to reports considered.
3. Special Rapporteurs
The Commission has appointed a number of special rapporteurs,
with varying degrees of success. There is no obvious legal basis for the
appointment of the special rapporteurs in the Charter; it has been
described as another innovation of the Commission.9 5 There has been
widespread criticism of the lack of effective action on the part of the
Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial
Executions, while the same is true of at least the first incumbent in the
position of Special Rapporteur on the Conditions of Women in Africa.
93. Id. at art. 62. For a discussion, see Malcolm Evans et al., The Reporting
Mechanism of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, in THE AFRICAN
See also George W.
CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 36.
Mugwanya, Examination of State Reports by the African Commission: A Critical
Appraisal, 1 AFR. HUM. RrS. L.J. 268 (2001).
94. See HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INAFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 128.
95. It has been argued that the legal justification is to be found in article 46, which
allows for "any appropriate method of investigation." See African Charter, supra note 8,
at art. 46. For a discussion, see Julia Harrington, Special Rapporteurs of the African
Commission on Human andPeoples 'Rights, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 247 (2001); Malcolm
Evans & Rachel Murray, The Special Rapporteurs in the African system, in THE AFRICAN
CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 280. For the mandates of the
special rapporteurs, see HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 223.
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In contrast, the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of
Detention in Africa has set the standards for years to come.
The Commission has now also appointed a Working Group on
Freedom of Expression and a Working Group of Experts on Indigenous
People or Communities.
4. Site Visits
Since 1995, the Commission has conducted a number of on-site
visits. These involve
a range of activities, from fact-finding to general
96
promotional visits.

5. Resolutions

The Commission has adopted resolutions on a number of human
rights issues in Africa. In addition to country-specific and other more ad
hoc resolutions, they have adopted resolutions on topics such as the
following: fair trial; freedom of association; human and peoples' rights
education; humanitarian law; contemporary forms of slavery; antipersonnel mines; prisons in Africa; the independence of the judiciary; the
electoral process and participatory governance; the International
Criminal Court; the death penalty; torture; HIV/AIDS; and freedom of
expression. 97
NGOs have a special relationship with the Commission. 98 Large
numbers have registered for affiliate status. 99 NGOs are often
instrumental in bringing cases to the Commission; they sometimes
submit shadow reports, propose agenda items at the outset of
Commission sessions, and provide logistical and other support to the
Commission, for example by placing interns at the Commission and
providing support to the special rapporteurs and missions of the
Commission. NGOs often organise special NGO workshops just prior to
Commission sessions and participate actively in the public sessions of
the Commission. NGOs also collaborate with the Commission in
96. See Murray, supranote 90, at 100.
97. See HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INAFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 196.
98. See Ahmed Motala, Non-governmental Organisations in the African System, in
THE AFRICAN CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 246; Claude E.

Welch,

PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (1995).

STRATEGIES AND ROLES OF NON-

99. The Resolution on the Co-operation between the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights and NGOs having Observer Status with the Commission is reprinted
in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 215. National human rights

institutions may register for observer status. The Resolution on Granting Observer Status
to National Human Rights Institutions in Africa is reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN

AFRICA (1999), supra note 2, at 217.
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developing normative resolutions and new protocols to the African
Charter.
The Charter does not contain a provision in terms of which the
Commission has the power to take provisional or interim measures
requesting state parties to abstain from causing irreparable harm.
However, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission grant the
Commission the power to do so. 1°° The Commission has used these
provisional or interim measures in a number of cases. One such case
concerned the Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and others, who had been
sentenced to death by a special tribunal set up by the military
government in Nigeria. 10 1 In that particular case, the interim measures
requesting the Nigerian government not to execute them were ignored.
The execution of Saro-Wiwa and the others caused a worldwide outcry.
In considering a subsequent individual communication, the
Commission held that Nigeria was a state party to the Charter. In terms
of the general obligation on state parties to realise Charter norms created
by article 1, Nigeria was bound by the Charter. The Commission said in
its decision that it had tried to assist Nigeria to meet its obligations under
the Charter by means of the interim measures, and the execution in the
face of the interim measures consequently violated article 1.
IV. The African Human Rights Court
Once the African Human Rights Court is in place, 10 2 it will

"complement" the protective mandate of the Commission under the
Charter. 10 3 The Court will consist of eleven judges, serving in their
individual capacities, 104 nominated by state parties to the Protocol,'0 5 and

100.

AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN &

PEOPLES'

RIGHTS, RULES OF PROCEDURE

ACHPR/RP/XIX, RULE 111, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (1997), supra
note 2, at 11. For a discussion, see Gino J. Naldi, Interim Measures of Protection in the
African System for the Protectionof Human and Peoples' Rights, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J.
1 (2002).
101. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, AFRICAN COMM'N, COMMUNICATIONS 137/94, 139/94,
154/96, & 161/97, Int'l Pen & Others v. Nigeria, 12TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT (199899).
102. For commentary on the Protocol, see Konstantinos Magliveras & Gino J. Naldi,
Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: The Protocolon the Establishmentof a
Regional Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, 16 NETH. HUM. RTS. Q. 431 (1998);
Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights Court:A Two-legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q.
350 (1991); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Towards the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45 (2000); see
also Julia Harrington, The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, in THE AFRICAN
CHARTER: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 305.
103.

AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTOCOL, supra note 12, at art. 2.

104.
105.

Id. at art. 11.
Id. at art. 12.
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10 6
elected by the Assembly. Only the president will be full-time.
The Protocol provides that the judges will be appointed in their
individual capacities, 0 7 and their independence is guaranteed.108 Special
provision is made that "[t]he position of judge of the Court is
incompatible with any activity that might interfere with the independence

or impartiality of such ajudge. . . ,109 A judge will not be allowed to sit

in a case if that judge is a national of a state that is a party to the case.' 10
The seat of the Court is still to be determined by the Assembly."
In respect to the Court's findings, the Protocol determines that "[i]f
the Court finds that there has been a violation of a human or peoples'
right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including
the payment of fair compensation or reparation.,, 1 2 The3 Court is
explicitly granted the powers to adopt provisional measures. 1
By ratifying the Protocol, states accept that the Commission and the
states involved will be in a position to take a case that has appeared
before them to the African Human Rights Court to obtain a legally
binding decision.' 14 Individuals and those who act on their behalf will be
able to take cases to the Court only in respect to those states that have
made an additional declaration specifically authorising them to do so. In
such instances, the case will have to be taken "directly" to the Court,
presumably bypassing the Commission. 115
Article 3(1) reads as follows:
The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the
Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument

106. Id. at art. 15(4).
107. Id. at art. 11.
108. Id. at art. 17.
109. Id. at art. 18. This is significant because one of the criticisms against the
Commission has been that a number of Commissioners have been closely associated with
the executive in their countries.
110. Id. at art. 22.
111. Id. at art. 25.
112. Id. at art. 27(1).
113. Id. at art. 27(2).
114. Id. at art. 5(1).
115. Id. at art. 5(3) (read with id. at art. 34(6)). Only Burkina Faso has so far made
such a declaration, and it will be surprising if many states follow soon. Where a state has
not made the additional declaration, the access of the individual to the Court will be as it
is under the Inter-American system-the individual does not have the power to seize the
Court himself or herself. Where the additional declaration has been made, the situation
of the individual resembles the current European system, where there is no Commission
and the Court is accessed directly. For criticism, see Christof Heyns, The African
Regional Human Rights System: In Need of Reform?, I AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 155 (2001).
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1 16
ratified by the states concerned.

The phrase "any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by
the states concerned," according to most commentators, means that
adjudication in respect to even United Nations and sub-regional human
rights instruments will fall within the jurisdiction of the African Human
Rights Court, provided that such treaties have been ratified by the states
17
concerned. 1
It is submitted that nothing is wrong with the African Human Rights8
Court interpreting the Charter in view of international standards."
However, if cases could be brought to the African Human Rights Court
on the ground that, for example United Nations treaties have been
violated, with no reference to the African Charter, this will lead to
jurisprudential chaos, and it will undermine the unique nature of the
African Charter. Instead, the word "relevant" human rights instrument
should be understood to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court beyond the
Charter and the Protocol only to those instances where the instrument in
question has explicitly provided for the jurisdiction of the Court-for
example as is the case in the Draft Protocol on the Rights of Women."1 9
V.

Conclusion

Much remains to be done to make the African human rights system
effective. I would venture to say there are a number of determinants for
the effectiveness of any regional human rights systems, which include
the following.
An adequate level of compliance with human rights norms on the
domestic level must occur in a significant number of the state parties.
Working national human rights systems are the building blocks of an
effective regional system. If the level of respect for human rights norms
on the domestic level is low, and domestic courts are not effective in
implementing these norms, there can be little hope for supra-national
enforcement.
The necessary political will must be present in the regional
organisation of which the system forms part, to ensure that the system

116. AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTOCOL, supra note 12, at art. 3(1).
117. See Magliveras & Naldi, supra note 102, at 435; Mutua, supra note 102, at 354;
Udombana, supra note 102, at 90.
118. It should be noted, however, that technically articles 60 and 61 of the African
Charter only provide that this should be done by the African Commission. See African

Charter, supra note 8, at arts. 60-61.
119. Article 23 of the Protocol on the Rights of Women provides that "The African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights shall be seized with matters of interpretation arising
from the application or interpretation of this Protocol." ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra
note 17, at art. 23.
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really works and is not an empty fagade. The regional organisation is the
primary body through which peer pressure must be channelled. The allimportant selection process of Commissioners and Judges must be taken
seriously by the regional body. The budgets allocated to human rights
organisations also often have an important influence on how effective
they are. The system must be properly serviced and able administrators
appointed.
Publicity for the work of the monitoring body or bodies of the
system is essential. The decisions and resolutions of these bodies must
be available, and disseminated on the national and regional level, to have
an impact. Publicity is needed so that those who want to comply
voluntarily know what is expected of them, but it is also necessary to
ensure that shame or peer pressure can be mobilised against recalcitrant
states. Peer pressure can change behaviour by inducing shame, or if that
does not work, by mobilising stronger forms of sanctions against states.
All of this is possible only when there is sufficient publicity. The
responsibility to see to it that there is publicity lies on the regional
system, the states, and civil society alike.
Trade and other links must exist between the state parties before a
regional human rights system can be enforced effectively. Without trade,
diplomatic communication, travel, and other links between state parties,
the conditions to impose sanctions to affect the behaviour of states do not
exist.
The independence, creativity, and wisdom of those who run the
system are absolutely crucial. This includes the Commissioners (and
judges) and the staff of the Commission (and Court), as well as the
officials of the regional organisation.
Resources are important, but the proper management of whatever
resources are available is more important.
The African regional human rights system is faced with almost
insurmountable challenges: massive violations on a continent of
immense diversity, where a tradition of domestic compliance with human
rights norms is still to be established. The trade and communication
links that are necessary to exercise influence over member states in many
cases do not exist.
Moreover, the system itself is also not currently well equipped to
face these challenges. The African Charter has severe shortcomings and
is in need of reform. The shortcomings in the African Charter relate to
the norms recognised (the omission of important civil and political as
well as socio-economic rights, the inclusion of concepts that are not easy
to translate into legal terms, and the absence of adequate rules in respect
to restrictions on rights) as well as the monitoring mechanism itself
(none of the main monitoring procedures allowed by the Commission-
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individual communications, state reports, and special rapporteurs-are
provided for explicitly in the Charter, and the provisions concerning
secrecy and massive violations should be scrapped). The African Charter
should be reformed to keep abreast of the times.
The continuous creation of new mechanisms for the protection of
human rights in Africa is not necessarily helping the situation. Instead of
focusing on getting the mechanism created by the African Charter, the
African Commission, to function properly, new mechanisms are created,
such as the African Human Rights Court. Even before the African
Human Rights Court is established, the NEPAD African Peer Review
Mechanism is developed, and so forth. In themselves all of these
mechanisms could be a viable starting point, but the current proliferation
of mechanisms means that there is a lack of focus of resources and effort,
with the result that none of them might be in a position to make any
difference.
The question should be asked which mechanism is mostly likely to
make a significant impact on human rights in Africa, and that particular
mechanism should be supported and developed until it is functioning
properly before other mechanisms are created.
If all the effort that goes into developing new mechanisms goes into
the Charter and the Commission, and thereafter the African Human
Rights Court, we would be able to point to a specific mechanism that
makes a real difference towards consolidating the gains of the struggles
of the people of Africa.

